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Abstract
Economic voting has long been a popular theory, explaining voting behavior;  its  application to
multilevel governance structures however is not widely studied. This research takes the EU as an
example  of  multi-layered  governance  structure  with  varying  democratic  practices,  and  applies
macro-level economic voting models to a sample of  141 elections in the 28 EU member states for
the 1990-2016 period. In order to assess the impact of the EU on the economic voting phenomenon,
a synthetic index of European economic integration was created, based on an existing methodology.
The  application  of  regression  analysis  on  key  macroeconomic  factors  on  the  support  for  the
incumbent prime-ministerial  party found that the macro-level economic voting hypothesis holds
true for a number of predictors, including the growth of gross domestic product, income inequality
and the effective number of parties. In the same time, the interactions with the integration index did
not lead, as hypothesized, to the complete disappearance of economic effects on the vote, so it could
not be claimed with certainty that European integration disqualifies the economic considerations of
voters in the EU member-states. 
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1. Introduction
Economic voting is one of the more popular theories explaining voting behavior, and it 
has provided quite good results in predicting the choice of voters. The basic premise that
economic voting has is that the electorate holds the government responsible for the 
developments of the economy, and so the changes in macroeconomic indicators may be 
used as a means of predicting future voting behavior.
While this premise holds true in many cases, it is most often applied only to national
governments, the most important reason for this being that there are but a few cases in
which it is feasible to expect that international organizations have a big enough impact
of national economies so that voters may redirect their blame or praise towards them.
The European Union is a rather unique case in that sense, because it has significant
influence on the economies of the member-states, but it does not completely overrule
their sovereignty and right to direct their own economies. This in turn may lead to a
blurring  of  responsibilities  between  the  national  governments  and  the  EU
administration, thus also mixing the economic voting behavior – in other words it could
be  expected  that  voters  which  attribute  high  importance  to  the  EU administration’s
economic policy would be less likely to punish national governments for bad economic
performance and reward them for good one.
While  economic  voting  in  the  EU has  been  studied  in  the  past,  the  actual  relation
between the strength of economic voting and the importance attributed to the impact of
the EU on economic policy has not, or the existing research is very dated, and most of it
is based on European parliament elections, not national ones.
The current study offers an alternative approach to the study of economic voting within
the European Union. While macroeconomic variables remain the primary factors for
electoral  performance,  this  study  uses  a  synthetic  index  of  European  economic
integration to measure the degree to which the particular countries are dependent on the
EU economy and its  economic policy decisions  at  the time of  each of  the separate
elections.
The range of this research is rather wide; it covers 141 individual elections in the 28
current member-states in the period between 1990 and 2016. Based on this data it was
established that there is solid evidence for the existence of economic voting in the pan-
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EU  context,  as  several  factors  such  as  economic  growth  and  income  inequality
maintained their significant effect on incumbent vote over a range of models.
What is more ambiguous however is the influence of European integration on economic
voting. While the tests carried out provide some evidence of weakening of the economic
effects as a result of the influence of European integration, no definitive evidence for the
complete blurring of the lines of responsibility was found.
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2. Theoretical background
2.1. The evolution of the theory of economic voting
The idea that there is a relationship between the performance of the economy and the
electoral success of governments is almost as old as voting theory itself. In the 1930’s
and 1940’s,  when wide-range  public  opinion polls  were  taking  their  first  steps  and
pioneering students of voting behavior were positing their first hypotheses as to why
voters  prefer  one  candidate  to  another,  Tibbits  (1931)  suggested  that  there  is  a
relationship between macroeconomic cycles  and voter  choice;  Gosnell  and Coleman
(1940) related the trends in the politics of Pennsylvania with the economic conditions of
the state.
It was in the 1960s that the development of economic voting theory really took off, with
the  publication  of  a  wide  array  of  seminal  works  in  the  field  which  shaped  its
appearance today. Key  (1966), based on US public opinion data and electoral results,
claimed that voters act rationally, and subsequently that they punish governments in
elections for economic failures. Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), studying the factors for
the popularity of prime ministerial parties in the UK studied the impact of two major
macroeconomic variables – unemployment and inflation, while also claiming that there
is a cycle in the support for the governing party between elections, characterized by a
slow decline after elections and around the middle of a particular government and a
surge before the next election. Furthermore, Goodhart and Bhansali introduced the idea
of adding a certain lag to the economic voting models;  in their  particular case they
claimed that when studying this phenomenon the effect of unemployment has a lag of
four to six months, while inflation does not exhibit such a delayed effect.
Kramer (1971) further enriches the theory of economic voting by considering the costs
associated  with  acquiring information and making an informed electoral  choice.  He
claimed that the economic performance of the incumbent party is a relatively “cheap”
way to obtain this information, compared to the alternatives – if the performance in the
pre-election  year  is  “satisfactory”  for  the  voters  they  would  support  the  incumbent,
otherwise  turn  to  the  opposition.  Kramer  applied  this  assumption  to  a  rather  large
number of congressional  elections in the US, while in the same time using a new set of
variables to  abstract  economic performance – growth of  per-capita  income,  costs  of
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living and the absolute change in unemployment. Kramer’s results however were mixed,
as he found that real income is the most important and significant factor, but in the same
time in his model unemployment had an effect contrary to the theoretical expectations.
Stigler (1973) however shed some doubt over the findings of the previous economic
voting theorists, claiming that the effects observed before him were barely significant
and were a result of very careful model setting. To prove this, Stigler took Kramer’s
models and by slightly adjusting the  time period and the independent variables made
the coefficients disappear and change signs. Despite the arising criticism, authors like
Tufte (1978) continued to use economic conditions as predictors of electoral results in
various types of elections, in this particular case the midterm congressional elections in
the US.
After the vast expansion of the base of empirical studies (the ones mentioned here are
but a few of the most prominent ones; as Lewis-Beck and Segmeir (2000) put it, the
number of papers on the topic quite soon “changed from a trickle to a torrent of over
300 articles and books on economics and elections”), the discussion went back to its
normative basis. A strong claim points out that the popularity and attraction of economic
voting comes to its close relationship with the idea of democratic accountability – in
practice,  economic  voting  is  but  a  paraphrasing  and  concretization  of  the  idea  that
citizens  (voters)  hold governments  responsible  for their  (economic)  performance (as
pointed out, inter alia, by Kuklinski and West 1981).
More importantly, all the tradition of economic voting literature so far has been focused
only on macro-level phenomena – macroeconomic indicators and their relationship to
vote results. In time economic voting models became more nuanced. Aside from the
need  for  a  certain  time  lag  when  using  macroeconomic  predictors  of  vote  choice,
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) put  forward the notion that  there is  also a maximum
period for which voters hold the memory of a government's  economic performance.
According to their myopia theory, voters “remember” economic events for no more than
a year and therefore it is of little use to introduce longer time series in economic voting
models.  Nannestad  and Paldam also  continued the  work  of  Goodhart and Bhansali
(1970) by  quantifying the loss of support over time, and found that ruling parties on
average lose 1.7 percent of their support over a single period in government.
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Macro level – or objective – economic voting theories suffer from one major drawback
–  there  is  a  possibility  that  their  results  are  spurious,  as  they  attempt  to  explain
individual-level  behavior  (voting  choice)  with  aggregate-level  data  (macroeconomic
factors and aggregated vote), or commit the so-called ecological fallacy (see Robinson,
1950). This, however, does not mean that macro-level results are necessarily wrong, but
rather that they need further corroboration from individual-level analysis. In order to
avoid possible issues in this direction, students of economic voting have more recently
turned to analyzing public opinion polls and the declared support for incumbent parties
and  perceived  economic  conditions  rather  than  the  actual  vote  and  registered
macroeconomic conditions.
Following this line of inquiry, Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) posit that voters follow their
perceptions of the state of the national economy rather than their personal economic
development. Similar to Goodhart and Bhansali, Fiorina (1978) claims that voters vote
upon the previous economic performance of governments rather than their  prospects
(and promises) for future economic achievements.
Individual-level studies have also helped uncover many different factors surrounding
economic voting, for instance that it  may depend on the left-right positioning of the
governing party  in  question  or  on  the  international  context  and on the  institutional
arrangements in the particular country, on its the globalization and economic integration
within the international  community. The latter  fall  under the category of “clarity  of
responsibility” issues of economic voting, which will be reviewed in more detail in the
following segment.
2.2. Clarity of responsibility in economic voting
In their seminal study Powell and Whitten (1993) put forward a rather novel idea to the
economic voting theory. While previously most studies have been focused on single
countries,  according  to  Powell  and  Whitten  most  have  faced  difficulties  when
attempting to include a large number of countries and time periods in a single model.
They attribute this “puzzle” to the lack of attention to the context and circumstances in
which voters evaluate the performance of policymakers, and claim that a number of
surrounding factors that need to be taken into account – the structure of the opposition,
the  structure  of  government  (be  it  minority  or  majority  governments,  coalitions  or
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single-party), and the overall institutional setting. Powell and Whitten found that for the
countries with blurred economic responsibility between opposition and government the
economic effects on vote were very weak, while in those where there was clarity of
responsibility they were significantly more noticeable, essentially opening the alley for
the introduction of  various  “environmental”  factors  to  account  for  this  in  economic
voting models.
Their  findings  were  corroborated  by  a  number  of  subsequent  studies:  Whitten  and
Palmer (1999) extended the theoretical framework over a significantly larger number of
cases and found that  the importance of  clarity  of responsibility  still  held;  Anderson
(2000) added the clarity of available alternative and found that the economic effects on
the vote are stronger where there are fewer viable political alternatives; Nadeau et. al.
(2002) also considered factors the importance of party system fracturing, government
longevity  and  ideological  cohesion  of  the  government  and  the  proportional  of
parliament seats held by the governing party or parties. Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci
(2013) demonstrated that in some cases it is worthwhile to separate the various clarity of
responsibility factors and show that while government cohesion has a direct impact on
economic voting,  formal institutional rules do not,  at  least  in the EU countries they
studied.
The  clarity  of  responsibility  theory  has,  inevitably,  also  drawn  criticism  -  Royed,
Leyden, and Borrelli (2000), while revisiting Powell and Whitten’s original hypothesis
over an extended set of cases, found that, contrary to their argument, strong economic
effects  were  observed  in  countries  with  apparently  low  clarity  of  responsibility.
Furthermore,  they claim that  there could be a  factor  which causes strong economic
effects in countries with coalition governments, and stress on the need to focus on an
alternative reading of the political  context of the studied countries. Anderson (2007)
added  that  recent  empirical  findings  should  force  scholars  to  rethink  the  ways  that
economic voting is analyzed due to its highly contingent nature.
Most  importantly  for  the  current  analysis,  clarity  of  responsibility  has  yet  another
dimension – that of multilevel governance. In other words, when there is more than one
level of decision-making, there is a possibility that responsibility for the outcome of the
decisions  becomes  blurred.  This  is  especially  true  for  economic  policy,  where  the
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outcomes are the result of a myriad of interconnected factors such as tax regulations,
trade regimes, central bank policies, investment, which are often the responsibility of
many different actors. Anderson (2006) tested the impact of multilevel governance on
the subnational level and found that greater fiscal independence of the local government
structures led to decreases in the economic effects on the vote for national governments.
According to Anderson, accounting for multilevel governance may well be the “missing
piece of the puzzle” which would make economic voting models widely applicable and
reliable over multiple countries and years (he himself, however, tested only developed
democracies and elections at the end of the 90’s).
Following  the  same  argument  on  the  impact  of  the  decentralization,  León  (2010)
focused only  on  the  “asymmetrically  decentralized  system” of  the  Spanish  State  of
Autonomies  over  twenty years.  She discovered that  clarity  a responsibility  has a  u-
shaped form; where the power over economic affairs was clearly endowed with either in
the local or the central government there were strong economic effects, while where the
responsibility is unclear, they were much weaker.
Both those studies focused on multilevel governance within the state; a possible reason
for  this  is  that  there  are  very  few  cases  of  supranational  economic  and  political
integration to allow for sufficient blurring of the lines of responsibility to impact voting.
Such however exists, and has been studied quite extensively, in the European Union.
While  similar  conditions  may  also  be  found  in  federal  and/or  highly  decentralized
countries, where many governance decisions are taken on a rather low level and the
distance between the central government and the individual voter is pretty large, they
still lack the variety of conditions and contextual factors which can be examined when
focusing on the EU as a whole. As the separate European countries have quite distinct
history of political and social development and varying institutional settings, while in
the same time being integrated in the same multilevel governance structure – the EU –
they make a most appropriate setting for the study of economic voting both over a wide
range of countries and in the presence of multilevel governance. 
2.3. Economic voting in the European union
The distribution of power and decision-making rights in the European Union has been
the subject of quite extensive academic interest, and there is a general consensus that the
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process of European integration has created a fleshed out and functioning system of
multilevel governance (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999);
some even argue that it has started forming a government proper (Jordan, 2001). Given
the previous findings of clarity of responsibility research, the market integration and
redistribution through the EU budget may lead to blurring of the lines of responsibility
between the national governments and the administration of the EU.
Most  of  the  scholarship  on  the  subject  has  focused  on  the  elections  for  European
Parliament(EP), as they are the ones which are truly specific for the EU. Studying the
2004 and 2009 EU elections,  Bartkowska and Tiemann (2015) found that  economic
factors were significantly related to the support granted to government parties in EP
elections and focus on the importance of the factors behind vote abstention in them.
Bartkowska  and  Tiemann  establish  that  the  perceived  importance  of  the  European
institutions for economic policy is a determinant for economic voting – those voters
who claim that national governments hold economic decision-making power are more
likely  to  vote  economically  compared  to  those  who  believe  that  this  power  is
concentrated in Brussels as a result of EU integration. Okolikj and Quinlan (2016) focus
on the 2009 and 2014 EP elections and support the previous findings – they find that the
economic effects were even stronger in 2014 and that the economic crisis sharpened that
economic  motivation  behind  party  support,  especially  in  countries  which  received
bailouts. They also establish that national concerns, rather than “true European” ones
were more important when voting in EP elections.
One fundamental issue with the study of EP elections is that they are considered to be
second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), perceived as having lesser importance
compared to  national  elections  by the  voters.  While  some more  recent  studies  shed
doubt that they remain second-order after the 2004 enlargement (for instance,  Koepke
and  Ringe,  2006)  this  in  turn  means  that  it  is  not  possible  to  directly  transfer
observations from EP elections to national elections, or even expect similar electoral
behavior.
Several studies have also focused on the impact of the economic importance of the EU
in  national  elections.  Lobo  and  Lewis-Beck  (2012)  focus  on  the  worst-hit  by  the
economic  crisis  countries  –  Italy,  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal  –  and  find  that  the
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perceived economic responsibility of the EU is a significant modifier of the economic
voting factor; as the perceived importance of the EU grows, the economic voting factor
shrinks.  Delving further  into the  same subset  of  countries,  Lewis-Beck and Nadeau
(2012)  found  that  they  exhibit  strong  economic  voting,  which  only  magnifies  the
findings of the previous study.
Finally, there are also some studies which use the EU as a common denominator for
studying economic voting. Roberts (2008) studied the 10 Central and Eastern European
members of the EU and established the existence of a rather extreme form of economic
voting, which he dubbed “hyper accountability” - not only did voters in these countries
vote  economically,  but  their  economic  voting  did  not  translate  into  the  traditional
punishment-or-reward  dichotomy,  but  rather  punishment-or-greater-punishment;
virtually all governments lost votes between elections, but those with poor economic
performance  lost  significantly  more  support.  Ju  (2016)  revisited  the  same  set  of
countries, and established that over a longer timespan even more economic factors bear
importance for the vote results. Talving (2016) on the other hand focused on Western
Europe and found strong links between perceived economic performance and incumbent
party  support;  she  also  stressed  the  importance  of  economic  policy  as  predictor  of
individual vote choice.
2.4. Criticism and caveats
Aside  from  the  aforementioned  possibility  of  falling  into  an  ecological  fallacy
pertaining to macro-level  economic voting studies,  there are  several other important
criticism which need to be kept in mind when studying the phenomenon. One such is
endogeneity – the possibility that political support and economic perceptions are linked
not  as  economic  voting  theory  suggest,  but  the  other  way  around  and  political
preferences  determine  the  way  voters  perceive  economic  realities  (see,  inter  alia,
Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs,1997). This issue is a more important problem for micro-
level studies, as they use party preference and perceived economic conditions, and while
correlation between those and actual election results and real economic conditions are
quite close, they never represent each other perfectly. Endogeneity can be the product
both of partisan bias and of simple lack of knowledge of the economy, as shown by
Nannestad and Paldam (1994).
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As discussed above, a number of studies also demonstrate the instability of the results –
it often becomes more difficult to maintain the significance of economic effects over
larger temporal or spatial samples, and models are often very sensitive to minor changes
in the variable composition and case selection.  This calls  for more rigorous testing,
estimating a number of different models, with different variable compositions and on
different subsets of data as well as employment of validation techniques in order to
avoid the possibility of spurious and unstable relationships. A related issue is also the
homogeneity of economic effects; as Duch, Palmer, and Anderson (2000) demonstrate,
economic effects can be different for various groups of people – in their case the more
informed citizens, but applicable among many other separate social groups.
Providing certain, at least  partial  solution to these problems is among the goals this
study; while  findings may be difficult  to  compare due to vastly  different  contextual
factors  of  the  separate  cases,  here  I  attempt  to  merge  a  wide  variety  of  different
countries and elections, thus highlighting a potential underlying common mechanism.
The way this is done is discussed in greater detail in  chapter four, dedicated to research
design. 
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3. Hypothesis – the impact of European integration on economic voting in the EU
As the previous chapter described, economic voting theory is centered around the idea
of  economic  responsibility, and  the  voter’s awareness  and  willingness  to  punish  or
reward  governments  for  the  performance  of  the  national  economy.  The  clarity  of
responsibility  concept  adds  that  economic  voting  is  a  viable  explanation  of  voting
behavior only in cases where the responsibility for the performance of the economy can
be reasonably attributed and placed within the control of the central government (or the
government  that  the  particular  vote  is  directed  at);  the  application  of  the  economic
voting  theory  becomes  harder  in  cases  where  clear  economic  responsibility  is  not
present. 
The main goal of this study is to establish whether there is a blurring of the lines of
responsibility  in the complex institutional  context  of the European union.  The quite
extensive  literature  devoted  to  European integration  (see,  for  instance,  Kelstrup and
Williams, 2006; Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998; Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) leaves little
doubt  of  the  very  deep  economic  and  political  –  both  horizontal  and  vertical  –
integration between the member states of the European union. There are multiple ties
among  them  –  the  common  market  and  trade  area,  free  movement  of  people  and
common policies in various areas from agriculture and development to foreign relations.
As a result of the “ever closer union”, however, inevitably an even more significant part
of the political and economic coordination of the member-states is conducted via the
administration and institutions of the European union; this has especially been true after
the rise of the economic crisis and the financial bailouts for a number of the hardest-hit
countries,  the  introduction  of  several  stimulus  packages  and  recovery  and  the
strengthening of economic conditionality within the EU (Van Riet, 2010; Sacchi, 2015;
Schmidt,  2014).  This process,  I claim, may have taken away some of the ability of
national governments to control the development of the economy of their own countries;
of importance may also be the habit of a number of governments to shift the blame for
bad economic or other performance to Brussels, thus leaving the impression that the EU
administration  has  assumed  control  of  the  most  important  political  and  economic
decision-making. Even less responsibility is left to the countries which are members of
the Eurozone, as they have little control not only over their economic policy, but also
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their  fiscal  policy as  a  result  of  the  delegation  of  the fiscal  policy  decision-making
process to the European central bank.
The interplay between European integration and economic voting is a result of the other
specific trait of the EU integration – the so-coined ‘democratic deficit’ (see Follesdal
and Hix, 2006) of the institutions of the EU. In a nutshell, the democratic deficit means
that most of the institutions of the EU have relatively low democratic accountability and
little oversight from democratically elected bodies and officials relative to their decision
making power and the consequences of their policies; there also are a few mechanisms
allowing the democratically elected national governments  to influence those institutions
directly, especially those of the smaller countries.
I expect that the combination of democratic deficit and the transfer to a certain extent of
the power to influence the national economies would result in a blurring of the lines of
the economic responsibility of the national governments of the member states of the EU.
Naturally, in  order  to  even discuss  responsibility  in  terms of  economic  voting,  it  is
necessary to first  establish the existence of the economic voting phenomenon in the
particular context; therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is, as follows:
H1:  Voters  in  the  member  states  of  the  European  punish  the  incumbent
government for bad economic performance by voting for the opposition in national
elections, and, conversely reward the incumbent government for good economic
performance by voting for it in elections.
Once that the existence of the economic voting phenomenon has been established (or
rejected),  the  second  hypothesis  to  be  tested  concerns  the  consequences  of  the
integration of the EU, as follows:
H2: The higher the degree of economic integration of the EU member states is, the
smaller is the economic effect on the incumbent vote.
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4. Research design
As was demonstrated in the second chapter, there are a couple of different approaches
towards the study of economic voting. The pioneering research used primarily macro-
level economic data and election results, while focusing on single countries or a small
selection  of  countries,  while  newer research  generally  prefers  using  individual-level
survey data as the source of both independent and dependent variables. There is also a
wide array of statistical instruments available for the processing and analyzing the data,
which bring to the table different types of abstraction and provide different insights into
the observed empirical dependencies and relationships. These choices influence greatly
the  final  results  and  outcomes  of  the  study, so  in  this  section  I  will  describe  the
motivation behind each of them in detail.
4.1. The comparative study design
The most basic choice in any social or political research is whether to study a single
case or make comparisons among many. As the specifics of the European Union (at
present) do not allow it to be treated as a single case, unless the studied matter concerns
the  European  administration  and  common  policies  itself,  it  lends  itself  to  the
comparative study of its individual members, which, while retaining certain differences
between each other, form a generally homogeneous group of countries.
Landman (2003) offers an excellent  enumeration of the advantages and purposes of
comparative studies, which here I summarize briefly as they pertain to the current study.
He finds the comparative approach to be most appropriate in situations where the aim is
achieving a relatively high level of abstraction and discovering common, underlying
trends, characteristics and conditions, which in turn allow for achieving knowledge and
information which is not specific for the separate cases, but can be generalized and
further applied as a principle over a wide number of cases.
A necessary  clarification,  however, is  that  true  generalization  can  only  be  found in
natural  sciences,  and  even  there  some  exceptions  of  generally  true  and  universally
applicable laws exist. While in the study of social phenomena some general conditions
do exist  –  all  societies  have  economies  and  some sort  of  organization  of  common
affairs, or government – they tend to be so divergent that it is nearly impossible to find
general  principles  which  hold  true  for  all  of  them  (as  shown,  for  instance,  by
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Ebbinghaus, 2005). Because of this, most research focuses on a subset of countries or
social groups which exhibit common characteristics, as among them it is reasonable to
expect similar phenomena.
In this particular case, the comparison is among 141 individual elections held in the
countries  in  the  European  Union  between  1990  and  2016;  the  lower  limit  of  the
timeframe  is  set  primarily  by  the  availability  of  data  and  the  specifics  of  the
measurement of European integration, which would not be feasible for a longer period
(for more details see the chapter on the composition of the integration index).
4.2. Level of analysis
The choice between micro- and macro-level study denotes the difference in the unit of
analysis – while the former analysis the behavior, choice and decisions of the individual,
the latter studies those of the group – in the case of macro-level voting studies, those of
an entire electoral body. As was discussed in the theoretical framework, the choice of
one  over  the  other  is  a  tradeoff  between  the  limitations  and  shortfalls  of  the  two
approaches. For the macro-level studies these are primarily mathematical problems and
the need to avoid the ecological fallacy; these issues prompted the majority of research
on economic voting to focus on the individual level.
There are a number of issues with micro-level design, which become magnified with the
increase of the scale  of  the study. As the sample includes many countries  from the
former Eastern Bloc and relatively new members of the European Union, there would
have been a number of gaps and differences in the availability of survey data, which in
turn would have prompted me to “stitch” data from several independent surveys; this is
not  desirable  as  the data  would not have been consistent  and equivalent  due to  the
different methodologies applied by the different studies. Of some importance is also the
discrepancy between the reported voting preference in polls and the actual votes cast in
the election (see Asher, 2016), which is essentially multiplied with the inclusion of more
heterogeneous cases in the sample, especially where voters have broader choice and are
more prone to abruptly switch their preference, as is the case of many Eastern European
countries (see Gherghina, 2014). Тhere is often even a greater discrepancy between the
declared intention to vote and the actual act of voting – Todd (2012) demonstrates that it
is quite often that respondents  who self-report an intention to vote actually do not.
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Furthermore, Kramer (1983) points out that a relatively small portion of the income of
the individual is attributed to the actions of the government,  and as a result  the the
magnitude of government-induced change in the perceived economic conditions may be
distorted. Conversely, conducting both individual- and macro-level analysis on the same
cases, Erikson (2004) finds that the economic effect on the vote as measured on the
individual level is almost twice as large compared to that on the macro level. Comparing
the  claims  of  Erikson and Kramer  gives  an  impression  that  the  variability  between
micro- and macro-level analysis of economic voting is  quite case-specific,  and their
equivalence should be claimed with caution and further analysis. 
I do not claim that the micro level of analysis is by any means inferior to the macro
level, but merely that the latter is better suited for the purposes of my analysis. Using
macro indicators allows me to have uniform and conforming measurements across all
the  variables,  without  the  need  to  correct  them  to  take  into  account  the  possibly
fundamentally  different  understandings  of  the  populations  of  the  EU  countries  for
economic development; sticking only to it avoids the possibility to mix the levels of
analysis, introduced by the objective(and macro-level) measurement of the degree of
EU economic integration.
As far as the possibility for committing an ecological fallacy, previous research has
demonstrated  that  the  hypothesized  here  relationship  between the  shift  of  economic
responsibility in the European Union and economic voting exists on the individual level
– Lewis-Beck and Lobo (2013), for instance, have shown that the individual perception
of the economic responsibility of the EU is a significant predictor of vote choice both as
a  standalone  variable  and  as  a  modifier  of  individual  perception  of  the  economic
development; in my analysis I transfer essentially the same hypothesis on the macro
level and test it over a larger sample of countries and elections.
A final  consideration is  the  ability  to  construct  not  only  explanatory, but  predictive
models (see Taagepera, 2007; Taagepera, 2008; Steyeberg et. al., 2003), which may be
applied  for  the  prediction  of  electoral  results  in  Europe  on  the  basis  of  economic
development. One of the key requirements for the successful construction of predictive
models is parsimony – the use of as few predictors as possible, keep them as simple as
possible  and  have  as  few  assumptions  as  possible.  Overall,  macro  data  fits  this
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requirement better, especially in terms of real-world application, as while individual-
level data may not be readily available or usable, macro data more often than not is, and
is significantly simpler to interpret and apply.
4.3. Operationalizing vote choice, economic performance and clarity of responsibility
4.3.1. Vote choice
The study of economic voting inevitably focuses on vote choice, and the selection of the
macro level of analysis poses the further constraint to study the electoral preference of
groups of people. While this can, theoretically, be done on the regional or municipal
level, data is not readily available  for all the EU countries, and if it were, due to the
differences in their electoral systems it would not be directly comparable (Birch, 2001).
These  specifics  and incomparabilities  limit  the  analysis  to  the  national  level;  as  all
European electoral systems at a certain point translate electoral results gathered in the
local level to a distribution of seats in a representative assembly, without taking into
account  the different  electoral  systems it  is  safe  to  assume that  the electoral  results
among all of them are comparable, as all can be interpreted as a share of the total vote in
a given country or as a share of the total number of seats in its representative assembly.
The next important question is – whose vote? Government types differ greatly between
countries, as  does their composition. Most studies of economic voting in the US focus
on the support(or vote) for the president or the presidential party(for instance, Erikson,
2009), as they are widely perceived to hold the decision-making power sufficient to
influence economic development. In Europe, however, there is no uniform formula for
power distribution, as various systems with different power structures exist, with most
of the power sometimes vested in the president (e.g. in France), but more often in the
prime minister. In parliamentary democracies, however, it is quite possible that coalition
governments  be  formed,  leading  to  the  division  of  decision  making  power  among
several parties and thus blurring of responsibility. Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun (2014)
however demonstrate that junior coalition members do not benefit in elections as the
result of good economic development of the country; even more, according their study
of German elections the prime minster herself is the focus of economic responsibility.
Fisher  and Hobolt  (2010) also  find  that  voters  hold  the  head-of-government's  party
chiefly responsible. Because of these findings I will take into account only the electoral
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result of the prime minister’s party, and not any junior coalition members, or opposition
parties. A secondary line of reasoning for focusing only on the head-of-government’s
party is that there are very few cases where a previous prime minister’s party gets such a
small fraction of the vote that it becomes a minor member of the opposition or falls
under an electoral threshold (aside from the 2010 election in Latvia, 2006 in Slovakia
and 2013 in the Czech Republic, where the incumbent parties received less than 10% of
the vote), thus ensuring the internal integrity and continuity of the dataset and avoiding
the possibility of disproportionally large economic effects.
Of importance is also whether the incumbent vote is measured as the change of the vote
received by the prime minister’s party between the two elections, comparable with the
rest of the countries in the dataset, or as the “raw” vote received in the current election
(as done, for instance, by Roberts, 2008). The later usually includes the previous vote
for the incumbent among the predictor variables, treating the two elections as snapshots
of the support the party; the prior rather treats the change in support as a process. As
both lines of thought have their own merit, I will simply use both as dependent variables
in  series  of  models,  accordingly  adjusting  the  predictors  to  match  their  momentous
versus fluid character.
4.3.2 Economic performance
On the macro level of analysis the choice of measurement of economic performance is
quite  limited,  compared  to  the  micro  level,  and  usually  boils  down  to  several
macroeconomic indicators, which summarize the current state of the economy in the
period before the election.  The two “classic” variables, introduced by  Goodhart and
Bhansali  (1970)  are  inflation  and  unemployment,  as  they  are  the  two  which  most
directly  affect  the  voters  –  inflation  by  reducing  the  purchasing  power  of  voter’s
salaries,  unemployment  as  a  measurement  of  joblessness  and the  state  of  the  labor
market.  Later  the  change  in  gross  domestic  product  was  added  to  the  mix  as  a
measurement of the wealth of the country and its population.
A more recent trend is the inclusion of income inequality of economic voting models
(Gelman et al., 2010; Linn and Nagler, 2014; Castillo, 2010), the rationale being that
while the macroeconomic variables, especially the ones related to wealth, may point to a
booming  and  well-developing  economy, this  may  affect  the  different  social  classes
21
differently. While the findings so far have been mixed, I will still include inequality
among the measurements of economic performance, if only to be used as a modifier of
the other variables. Another emerging idea after the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is
the inclusion of national debt in voting models (for instance by Alesina and Passalacqua,
2016), but as so far there is little empirical backing for such theories I have decided
against including debt.
A possibility that also needs to be considered is that voters do not treat economic growth
and economic decline the same way, and as a result they punish governments for bad
performance but do not reward them for good performance, or vice versa. In order to
take this into consideration, a common approach is to apply economic trend dummies
(Roberts, 2008, Campbell, 1992), which I will follow.
While  on  the  micro  level  it  is  possible  and  worthwhile  to  investigate  both  the
retrospective(how the  voters  think  the  economy has  performed  under  the  particular
government) and prospective(how voters believe that the economy will perform in the
future)  perceived  economic  performance,  on  the  macro  level  the  prospective
development  of  the  indicators  would  chiefly  represent  the  opinion  and  analysis  of
experts and analysts. It could be argued that they have certain influence over voter’s
expectations of the future economy through the media, but recent studies (Michelitch et
al.,  2012,  Lacy  and  Christenson,  2016)  find  that  even  on  the  individual  level  the
prospective evaluations have significant impact on the voting preferences only for the
most  informed  voters.  It  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  this  impact  will  be  even  less
significant on the national level, and for this reason I will include only retrospective
measurements of economic performance.
The macro level of analysis also omits the choice between sociotropic and egocentric
perception of the economy; as it  is not possible to factor in the development of the
personal or household-level economy, it is limited to the national. This choice is further
supported by current dominant theory , according to which voters perceive the economic
effects in a sociotropic fashion (see, for instance, Kiewiet, & Lewis-Beck, 2011), which
means that their economic preferences and perceptions are turned towards the national
economy rather than their personal economy.
3.3 Clarity of responsibility and other variables
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Since the novel aspect (aside from the widened scope) of this study is the examination
of  the  clarity  responsibility  in  the  European  Union,  there  is  a  separate  chapter
immediately following this one dedicated to the detailed description of the construction
and  calculation  of  an  index  of  economic  integration  in  the  EU  and  the  economic
interdependence  between  the  member-states  to  match  the  objective  macro-level
economic variables. This said, it is necessary to take into account some other factors for
the  clarity  of  responsibility,  which  may  equally  well  explain  the  economic  voting
patterns of the citizens of the EU member-states.
When testing whether there is a blurring of responsibility on the supranational level, it is
also important to consider whether the blurring is not happening in the other direction,
within the country. A field of research in its own right, clarity of responsibility within
countries can be operationalized in many different ways, most of which go beyond the
scope of this study (for instance Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci (2013)’s composite index
of  government  cohesion  or  the  Powell-Whitten  (1993)  index).  This  said,  Anderson
(2006) and Leon (2010) demonstrate that vertical integration, operationalized as fiscal
autonomy on the local level can be sufficient to account for the impact of the in-country
blurring  of  economic  responsibility.  However,  all  the  comparative  data  on  fiscal
decentralization is either quite dated, or is overly complex for inclusion in this study; for
this reason I will focus solely on the supranational level. 
The inclusion of the new EU members means the introduction of younger democracies,
with more fluid political and party systems (Birch, 2001, Rose and Munro, 2003). As a
result of this, many of those countries may exhibit a “hypersupply” of different political
parties and shorter-than-expected governments, which in turn may lead to a blurring of
the lines of responsibility; while this may be true for some of the developed Western
democracies, their political and party systems are more stable. To take into account this
possible blurring of responsibility, some researches introduce the effective number of
parties  in the studied countries in  their  models (Anderson, 2000, Roberts,  2008, Ju,
2016), as defined by Laakso and Taageera (1979). It is expected that the more parties
there are, the higher the chance that voters turn away from the government party and
vote for an alternative; conversely, if there is little choice, voters may support the prime
minister's party despite its poor economic record. The effective number of parties can be
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expressed as the change between the previous and the current election; this approach
however has shown quite poor results in the past. Because of this, I simply include the
“raw”  effective  number  of  parliamentary  parties  produced  by  each  of  the  separate
elections as an indicator for the number of viable alternatives perceived by the voters.
As most of the studies of economic voting in the EU so far have focused either on the
Eastern or the Western part of the continent, there is also a possibility that the economic
voting mechanisms work differently in the two parts of Europe; for this reason a control
variable will be added to separate between them. As Lewis-Beck and Costa-Lobo (2011)
suggest,  it  is  possible  that  ideological  differences  cause  voters  to  hold  governments
accountable for different  economic developments,  and, assuming that  parties chiefly
rely on the support of voters sharing their ideology, a variable reflecting the ideological
position of the party on the left-right scale will also be added.
4.4. Data sources
The data used for a macro-level analysis of economic voting generally does not come
from a wide variety of sources. For the dependent variable – incumbent election results
– all  but the most recent election results were collected from the European Election
Database, and data on the most recent ones was collected from news reports, sourcing
the  respective  national  electoral  commissions  or  relevant  bodies.  The  counties  are
included in the study with the first election which took place after their accession to full
membership in the European union (e.g. elections in Finland, Austria and Sweden will
be included only if they were conducted after 1995; elections in Croatia are included
only after 2013). In the countries which employ majoritatian or mixed party systems the
element which is closest to the concept of “popular vote” has been included. The final
dataset  includes  141  separate  elections  in  the  28  countries  which  today  form  the
European Union. 
A couple of alternative sources could be used for the macroeconomic data, and while
Eurostat would be the natural choice as the research focuses on the EU, the data on the
development of the economies of the countries has been sourced from the database of
the World bank, as it offers longer and uninterrupted data series covering the countries
included. The data on the EU-index, discussed at  length in the following chapter, is
sourced  entirely  from Eurostat  in  order  to  avoid  differences  in  the  methodology of
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computation  of  the  various  components.  The effective  number  of  parties,  measured
according Taagepera and Laakso’s model is taken from Gallagher & Mitchell (2005)
(while their book The politics of electoral systems includes cases from an earlier period
compared  to  that  used  in  my  study,  they  provide  frequently  updated  supporting
information online, which currently covers  the entire period up to 2016).
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5. Compiling and computing an index of European economic integration
5.1. Re-creating the index of European economic integration
The economic integration between the countries of the EU is a very multifaceted and
multi-layered process; there is no single indicator which may describe and characterize
it which would be valid and acceptable for the measurement of EU-integration all the
member states without being misleading, one-sided or plainly false. For this reason, in
order to achieve an at least somewhat valid representation of the stages of economic
integration of the separate member states, it is necessary to create a composite indicator,
encompassing various measurements   and elements of the interconnectedness  of  the
European economies.
While much has been done in the direction of the creation of such indicators for global
economic integration (see, for instance, Martens and Zyweitz, 2006 or Dreher, 2006),
the rather unique nature of economic cooperation and interdependence in the EU makes
them unfit to fully explain the integration. The need for a EU-specific integration index
was met first comprehensively by König and Ohr (2013), whose methodology I will
follow quite closely in developing the index that I use. There was, however, a need to
extend the index developed by König and Ohr, as it only covers 14 member-states of the
EU, and measures the values of the index in two points in time – 1999 and 2010, while
the current study requires a continuous measurement of economic integration for the
period between 1990 and the present date, extending over all the member states.
In order to achieve this  goal,  however, I  was faced with the necessity  to somewhat
simplify the components of the index, completely doing away one of König and Ohr’s
original subsidences – the one dealing with the conformity of the member states with
the decisions and proceedings of the EU courts and judicial authorities – mostly due to
the need for extensive data collection and compilation beyond the temporal scope of this
study.  Instead  I  extended  and  gave  more  weight  to  the  indicators  concerning  the
openness and importance of the single market for the member states. A second choice I
had to make was to use imputation techniques to make up for some missing data, which
will be elaborated upon in a separate segment.
5.2. The components of the EU integration index
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5.2.1 Single market indicators – this category is split further in two subgroups, market
openness  and  marker  importance,  measuring  respectively  the  share  of  a  particular
indicator  in  the  overall  economy of  the  country  and  in  its  particular  sphere  in  the
particular member-state – for instance, intra-EU trade flows appear in the index both as
a  share  of  the  GDP and  as  a  share  of  the  total  trade  of  the  countries.  These  two
subsidences take into account trade in goods and services separately, as well as foreign
direct investment stocks and labor migration. The goal of this indicators is to assess how
much the declared goals of the single market – easing of the flow of goods, services,
finances  and labor  have  been  achieved  for  the  member-states,  and  what  significant
differences remain between them.
5.2.2 EU homogeneity indicators – one of the underlying strategic goals of the EU is
economic  convergence,  explicitly  stated  in  the  so-called  cohesion  policy,  aimed  at
convergence of various aspects of the economy – wealth, purchasing power, taxation,
prices. While such convergence is generally to be expected among countries with tight
trade and economic ties, this is especially true for those who share a common currency
and are a part of a special  trade area (as, shown, among others, by Giannetti  et al.,
2002), it could be expected that it will happen faster and to a higher extent as it is the
target  of  specific  policy.  It  could  be  argued  that  a  link  between  convergence  and
integration exist in the opposite direction as well, and that convergent economies are
easily integrated; this, however, does not put doubt on the existence of such a link. 
5.2.3  EU  symmetry  indicators –  this  group  of  indicators  demonstrates  the
synchronization between the economic cycles of the member-states; higher economic
integration  should mean that  the  economies  of  the member  states  react  similarly to
external and internal  economic shocks,  and as a result  their  economies develop and
deteriorate with a similar rate and direction (Artis and Zhang, 2001). These indicators
encompass several key macroeconomic factors, such as inflation, unemployment and
debt.
The table below summarizes the groups of indicators and the data source (Eurostat was
used wherever possible, and supplemented with other sources as necessary. The World
Bank was used for the EU symmetry macroeconomic indicators, as it provides time
series  going  significantly  further  back in  time  compared to  the  European  statistical
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agency). The first year for which the data on the particular countries is included in the
computation  of  the  index  corresponds  to  the  year  prior  to  their  accession  to  full
membership of the EU; the reason behind this choice is the existence of an integration
process  prior  to  the  full  acceptance  of  the  country  though  the  negotiation  process,
opening of borders to trade and movement and the targeted pre-accession funds. 
Table 1: Elements of the EU integration index
Group Indicator Description
Single market
– EU openness
Trade in goods Intra-EU import and export of goods in percent of GDP
Trade in services Intra-EU import and export of services in percent of GDP
Capital movement Inward and outward FDI stocks in percent of GDP
Labor movement European workers in percent of the total workforce
Single market
– EU
importance
Trade in goods Intra-EU import  and  export  of  goods in  percent  of  the  total
trade
Trade in services Intra-EU import and export of services in percent of total trade
Capital movement Inward and outward FDI stocks in percent of total FDI
Labor movement European workers in percent of the foreign employees
EU
homogeneity
Per capita income Real GDP per capita at current prices (2005=100, in PPP)
Long-term interest rate Long-term interest  rates  according  to  the  Maastricht  criteria
(10-year government bonds) 
Public debt ratio Gross government debt in percentage of GDP 
Consumer tax rate Implicit tax rate on consumption (consumption tax revenues in
relation to private consumption spending) 
Capital tax rate Implicit  tax rate  on capital  (taxes  on property and corporate
profits for private households and companies in relation to the
profit  and  investment  income of  the  private  households  and
companies)
EU Symmetry Inflation Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (percentage change to
the previous period, seasonally and trend adjusted)
Change in
unemployment
Unemployment rate (ILO definition, percentage change to the
previous period, seasonally and trend adjusted) 
Government net
borrowing
Government net borrowing as a percentage of GDP (percentage
change to the previous period seasonally and trend adjusted) 
Source: König and Ohr (2013), excerpt
5.3. Data imputation and normalization
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As mentioned above, the extended time range of this study means that some issues of
data availability appear, especially concerning the earliest and latest parts of the 1990-
2015 period. Due to large volumes of missing data some of the variables used by König
and Ohr have been dropped (labor costs, for instance, for which Eurostat offers updated
data once every five years, starting from 2000). For the variables where one or several
data points were missing I used data imputation though predictive mean matching, as
implemented in  the  mice package for R (for full  description of the package and its
methods, see van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). For some of the cases the
imputed values have been compared with alternative sources and have been found to
have no major differences or impossible deviations which can have substantial effect on
the computation of the EU integration index.
As  the  raw  indicators  use  different  scales  and  take  different  values,  prior  to  the
aggregation it was necessary that they be normalized to a uniform scale, ranging from 0
(complete lack of integration) to 100 (complete integration). The separate subsidences
use  different  normalization techniques,  tailored  to  their  specific  purpose.  The single
market  openness  subindex indicators  are  normalized relative to  the maximum value
achieved in any of the countries during the period, which is considered to be the peak of
integration. The single market importance are “naturally” scaled in the 0-100 range, as
they represent intra-EU fractions of the respective country totals. The EU homogeneity
subindex is equal to the degree of difference from the EU average subtracted from 100.
Finally, the EU symmetry indicators are rescaled relative to the respective annual EU
averages,  and  the  difference  is  again  subtracted  from 100  (the  weighing  procedure
follows as closely as applicable the original scheme applied by König and Ohr, 2013).
5.4. Use of principal component analysis and weight derivation
Following   König  and  Ohr’s  methodology,  I  applied  principal  component  analysis
(henceforth  PCA) for  the  derivation of  the  relative  weight  of  the  separate  variables
comprising the index. The reason for this is twofold – using PCA allows avoidance of
the often unfounded a priori weighing of the separate components, but also avoidance of
equal  treatment  of  all  the  components,  which  in  turn  may  conceal  the  internal
relationships between them. In the same time PCA underlines the inter-correlations and
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interdependencies of the separate components and derives their  importance from the
data itself rather than from an outside artificial source. 
While there are a number of separate implementations of PCA, for the purposes of my
analysis the most appropriate was the one in the psych package for R, as it incorporates
promax rotation of the components in the PCA procedure (for a full description, see
Revelle, 2017). Before proceeding to the PCA itself, it is worthwhile to test the usability
of the new extended dataset and compare it to the original tests performed by  König
and Ohr. Testing for internal consistency they use Cronbach’s (1951) alpha coefficient,
which  measures  and  standardizes  the  internal  correlation  between  the  separate
components. While König and Ohr’s dataset has an alpha coefficient of 0.82, the new
one has an alpha of 0.72 – still pointing to more than sufficient factorability, the lower
alpha  of  the  new  dataset  is  most  likely  a  result  of  the  introduction   of  more
heterogeneous economies and the longer timespan. Bartlett’s test of sphericity (with a
Chi2 = 7611.658, p = 0.000, compared to Chi2 = 3525.038, p = 0.000 of the original
index data)  and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s measure of sampling adequacy (MSA = 0.72,
compared to 0.62) further corroborate the applicability of the new data to König and
Ohr’s methodology.
A significant  difference between the weight  derivation for  the original  and the new
index  came after   the  application  of  scree  test  (see  Cattel,  1966)  to  determine  the
number  of  components  to  be used;  while  König  and Ohr  found that  the  first  three
components were sufficient to explain all the variance in the data, with the new data the
smooth decrease of eigenvalues started only after the fourth one, which explains 13% of
the total variance of the data, and it contained the highest values of the coefficients for
three of the elements of the index.
Having established that the data lends itself to PCA quite well, I applied promax oblique
rotation  for  the  extraction  of  the  standardized  loadings,  producing  the  results
summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Standardized loadings for the elements of the EU index
Rotated
Component 1
Rotated
Component 2
Rotated
Component 3
Rotated
Component 4
Final
weigh
EU import as % of GDP 0.80  0.07 0.12 0.00 4.4%
EU export as % of GDP 0.66 -0.07 0.43 -0.01 4.8%
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EU services import as % of GDP 0.05 0.88 0.07 0.03 4.5%
EU services export as % of GDP 0.06  0.86 0.20 0.09 5.1%
EU FDI inward as % of GDP -0.07  0.40 0.61 0.02 4.1%
EU FDI outward as % of GDP 0.24 0.29 0.15 -0.22 3.5%
EU workers as % of total -0.06 0.89  0.19  0.07 7.3%
EU import as % of total 0.66 0.10 -0.26 0.26 6%
EU export as % of GDP  0.68 0.18 0.05 0.05 4.3%
EU services import as % of total 0.86 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 4.9%
EU services export as % of total 0.84 -0.07 -0.15 0.10 6.6%
EU FDI inward as % of total 0.69 0.09 -0.27 -0.06 4.6%
EU FDI outward as % of total 0.37 -0.05 0.30 0.20 3.4%
EU workers as % of foreign -0.01  0.37 0.64 0.12 4.1%
GDP per capita -0.07 -0.85 0.31 -0.04 5.8%
Annual interest rate 0.07 -0.30 0.25  0.53 4%
Debt to GDP ratio -0.10 -0.43 -0.02  0.42 3.6%
Consumer tax rate  0.46 -0.15  0.31 -0.21 3.6%
Capital tax rate 0.29 -0.57 -0.13 -0.07 4.4%
Inflation -0.22 -0.10 0.62 -0.08 3.7%
Unemployment -0.02  0.25 0.04  0.58 3%
Net government borrowing -0.09   -0.25 0.06 -0.73 3.8%
Explained variance 4.50 4.37 2.09 1.64
Share of total variance  0.36  0.35 0.17  0.13
Source: Author’s calculations, highest rotated component in gray
The final weights used in the index were produced as the sum of the squared factor
loadings multiplied by the share of total variance of the corresponding component. It
has to be noted that the new weights are less polarized compared to the original ones,
most likely as a result of the introduction of more extreme and heterogeneous values in
the dataset. This also results in a less diversified participation of the individual elements,
all of which receive weighs in the range of 3-7% of the final value of the index; in
contrast, in the original index there were weighs accounting for as little as 0.5% of the
final value.
5.5. Results of the index
While  the  index  has  been  computed  for  each  of  the  individual  countries  for  each
individual year in the 1990-2015 period (see the histogram below), in order to include
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all of the present member-states (the EU-28) in a single ranking, I extract the results of
the subindex and the total index for 2014 – the second year during which Croatia is a
full member of the EU. The rankings are presented in Table 3 below.
Table 3: EU economic integration index rankings, 2014
Total SM Openness SM Importance Homogeneity EU Symmetry
Country  Rank Points  Rank Points  Rank Points  Rank Points  Rank Points
Belgium 1 79.24 2 50.33 6 87.18 8 84.84 1 94.61
Slovakia 2 78.26 4 47.85 2 94.43 21 77.45 2 93.29
Luxembourg 3 76.50 1 77.9 1 96.33 28 40.16 3 91.61
Czech Republic 4 74.61 5 39.53 5 88.13 11 81.89 4 88.88
Hungary 5 74.03 7 36.39 3 92.1 13 70.55 5 88.09
Estonia 6 73.56 3 48.6 7 87.13 24 70.73 6 87.78
Austria 7 73.40 17 26.3 4 88.83 2 91.25 7 87.23
Malta 8 69.61 11 32.2 20 71.86 1 91.37 8 83
Ireland 9 69.56 9 35.37 13 78.16 12 81.79 9 82.91
Poland 10 65.56 19 22.46 10 80.98 6 86.49 10 80.25
Lithuania 11 67.55 10 33.83 16 74.81 14 79.53 11 79.88
Finland 12 67.01 20 26.83 9 81 9 83.17 13 78.84
Slovenia 13 66.36 15 26.84 22 71.28 4 88.2 12 78.99
Netherlands 14 65.66 13 31.88 17 74.43 17 78.1 14 78.22
Bulgaria 15 65.59 12 31.99 19 73.21 15 79.00 15 78.16
Portugal 16 62.93 23 17.61 8 81.53 18 77.93 16 74.64
Germany 17 62.77 22 17.99 25 69.86 3 88.61 17 74.61
Croatia 18 62.49 21 19.72 12 78.18 19 77.88 19 74.18
Latvia 19 62.36 16 26.66 23 70.86 20 77.67 18 74.24
Sweden 20 62.16 14 29.77 11 79.28 25 65.66 20 73.94
Spain 21 61.64 27 11.8 15 75.48 7 86.20 21 73.08
Italy 22 61.43 25 14.16 24 70.61 5 88.01 22 72.92
France 23 60.97 24 15.7 18 73.91 10 81.91 23 72.37
Cyprus 24 60.78 18 24.19 21 71.43 22 81.91 24 72.31
Romania 25 59.21 25 15.7 14 77.01 23 73.93 25 70.2
Denmark 26 56.66 6 37.92 26 69.01 26 52.10 26 67.6
United Kingdom 27 53.89 26 13.98 27 59.29 16 78.24 27 64.04
Greece 28 40.94 28 7.64 28 57.64 27 50.05 28 48.42
Source: Author’s calculations, members states joined after 2004 in gray
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Figure 1: Histogram of the complete distribution of the index of European integration
(n = 532). Frequency on the y-axis. Source: Author’s calculations.
When analyzing the index for 2014, one needs to keep in mind a number of things,
primarily that this is a snapshot of the integration at a very late stage – all the member
states but Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia have already been a part of the EU  for at least
10 years, and the members of the EU-15 have been undergoing a process of integration
form 20 or more years. This late-stage integration is most evident in the EU Symmetry
ranking, which shows a very high level of synchronization of the economic cycles of all
member states but Greece, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the
inclusion of Luxembourg in the index suppresses the  ranking of all the other countries
in terms of single market  openness,  since it  has  rather  extreme values  of  trade and
capital movement relative to GDP. For this reason König and Ohr chose to exclude it
from the their index, but in the current case its impact has been somewhat lowered by
the inclusion of a wider array of countries, and, as will be demonstrated later it has not
impacted sgnificantly the ranking of the countries compared to König and Ohr’s original
index.
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Otherwise, the 2014 rankings reflect my expectations – there is a visible divide between
central and peripheral EU countries, the former being more integrated as their markets
are  more  focused  on  trade  and  investment  within  the  EU,  the  latter  having  more
economic ties outside the EU. There is also a visible division between smaller and larger
economies, as the larger ones – like Germany, France, and the UK – appear to have
more heterogamous economic  links,  while  the smaller  ones,  like Estonia and Malta
appear to rely more on their connections with the rest of the European Union. These two
reasons may also explain the fact that many newer member states tend to rank higher
compared to  older  ones,  as the newer member states tend to be smaller economies,
located in Central and Eastern Europe. The cases which go against these broad trends –
Belgium, which is the de facto capital of the EU, Luxembourg, which has a single-focus
economy linked deeply with the rest of the EU countries, and Cyprus, which is known
for its economic ties with Russia and some Middle Eastern countries and is the most
Figure 2:  Mean index  of  integration  per  group of  member  states,  Source:  Author’s
calculations
geographically remote member of the EU, are more of a confirmation of the trends as
for each of them there is a valid explanation why they differentiate from the rest of the
member states. Similarly to the original index, the new one highlights the very large
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distance between Greece and the rest of the member states at all points of the integration
process. 
It is also useful to observe at what rate does the value of the index change. Figure 2
above shows the change for the member states grouped by the year of their joining of
the EU. From the graph it is quite visible that the change in the mean integration index
is not that significant for the EU-12 group, as they have been part of the integration for
the longest. There is much more visible growth for the members accepted in 1995 and
2004; as the graph covers the index a year before their accession to full membership of
the EU, the quickest visible growth comes just after their full acceptance. There is also a
visible effect of the global economic crisis of 2009, on all groups but the countries who
joined in 2004 – shortly after the crisis their mean integration index suffers for several
years, before returning to growth. Despite the presence of some volatility though the
overall trend is toward deeper integration in the EU – in this sense it is quite safe to say
that the promise for an “ever closer union” is being fulfilled, albeit at a rather slow
growth rate.
5.6. Comparison with the previous index
In order to test the robustness of the new measurement of the EU integration index it is
also worthwhile to compare it directly with the one compiled by König and Ohr – while
it can be expected that there would be some differences due to the changes in the index
components  and  wider  data  range  used  in  the  normalization  procedure,  they  still
conceptually reflect the same phenomenon and should produce similar ranking of the
countries. Table 4 below compares the versions of the index for the countries included
in the original one, for the year 2010, the last one included.
Table 4: Comparison between König and Ohr’s index and the extended one for 2010
Country König and Ohr, 2013
Overall Rank
König and Ohr, 2013
Overall Points
New 
Overall Rank
New
Overall Points
Belgium 1 77.33 1 78.88
Austria 2 65.74 2 70.17
Netherlands 3 64.54 6 61.43
France 4 64.24 10 55.86
Germany 5 64.08 8 59.59
Ireland 6 62.35 3 68.75
35
Finland 7 61.54 7 59.64
Sweden 8 57.22 9 57.87
Spain 9 57.16 4 62.12
Italy 10 56.08 11 55.40
Portugal 11 55.86 5 61.84
Denmark 12 55.72 13 46.90
United Kingdom 13 52.17 12 52.10
Greece 14 43.65 14 43.29
Source: König and Ohr, 2013, Author’s calculations
While some differences exist,  they are not very dramatic;  mostly that Germany and
France have sunk quite significantly lower compared to their previous rank, while Spain
and Portugal have risen as a result of that. This is most likely the result of the higher
emphasis  put  on  trade  and  investment  in  the  extended  version  of  the  index.  More
importantly – as for the purposes of these study not the ranking, but the discrete values
are of bigger importance because this is the form in which they will be incorporated in
the economic voting models – the final points allocated to most of the countries are very
close to those in the original index.
7. Clustering the index data
A final approach towards verifying the index employed by  König and Ohr is clustering
the data and establishing groups of similar countries on the basis on the data used for the
compilation of the index for 2014. The result of hierarchical clustering based on the
euclidean  distance  (using  Ward’s  clustering,  see  Ward,  1963),  demonstrating  the
proximity  between the EU countries can be seen in the dendrogram in Figure 3. It
shows that  there is  number of groups of countries  which have similar  conditions  in
terms of integration, and the uniting factors overlap quite a lot with the factors that I
hypothesized to lie under the distribution of the index  - the overall size of the economy
and the nature of its business ties. All of the pre-2004 members of the EU but Italy,
Portugal, Greece and Spain – the countries hit the worst by the economic crisis, form a
branch of their own, as they share similar conditions; Luxembourg stands out even from
that group, as its economic is almost exclusively turned towards the EU. From there on,
the Nordic countries Denmark and Sweden have their own separate group, and so do
Austria  and Finland who joined the EU in 1995.  On the  other  hand,  the post-2004
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members form a separate large branch, further separated in several smaller groups – for
instance, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia, which top the integration ranking
have a distinct group of their own, and so do the two countries who joined the EU in
2007 – Bulgaria and Romania.
Figure 3:  Dendrogram of  the hierarchical  clustering  of  the  EU countries  based on
economic integration data for 2014. Source: Author’s calculations
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6. Empirical analysis
This chapter will present the empirical analysis of economic voting in the EU and the
impact  of  European  integration.  I  will  begin  with  a  descriptive  presentation  of  the
specifics of the data used in the models and continue with the application of several
models of the hypothesized relationship.
6.1. Descriptive statistics
6.1.1 Electoral data
The dataset used covers a total of 141 elections in the 28 member-states in the EU.
Inevitably, the founding members and early joining countries have bigger weight, as the
elections that took place in them during the entire period between 1990 and 2016 are
included, while for the newer members the elections included are only those after 2004
(or 2007 and 2013, respectively). As a result of the process of gradual inclusion of the
member  states,  the  older  members  are  usually  represented  in  the  dataset  with  6-7
elections, the the newer ones – with 3-4 elections. Greece is included with a total of 10
elections, as a result of the turbulent political developments in the country in the recent
years and having years with multiple elections, and Croatia has just two elections, due
to the fact that it became of full member of the EU only in 2013.
The overall trend is for incumbent governments to lose votes between elections; in a
total of 100 elections the incumbent government lost votes compared to the previous
election  in  which  the  government  was  created,  while  in  41  cases  the  incumbents
improved  their  support.  The  maximum  loss  between  elections  was  for  the  Greek
socialist party PASOK, which in 2012 lost 30.7% of the support it had just two years
ago. The largest electoral gain in the EU during the observed period was incurred by the
Austrian  People’s party  in  2002,  which  managed  to  increase  its  support  by  15.4%
compared to the 1999 election. On average, incumbents lost 4.4% of their vote over an
electoral cycle, with the caveat that these cycles can vary between a complete four- or
five-year period to just a couple of months in the most extreme cases.
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Figure 4: Distribution of incumbent party vote change between elections,  frequency on
the y-axis. The red dots denote the years spent in office, using the same axis as years.
Source: European election database, own calculations.
Looking only at the vote results, the majority of the incumbent parties win between 25
and 40% of the vote; while there are several deviations where the incumbents get above
50% or less than 10% of the vote, such occurrences are very rare. As far as the length of
the  electoral  cycles  is  concerned,  most  government  tend  to  last  the  regular  period
designated by law; there are 32 periods between elections which lasted less than 4 years,
and the mean period between elections is 3.7 years.
It  has  to  be  noted  that  there  are  some  differences  between  Eastern  and  Western
European governments. The electoral cycles in Easter Europe tend to be shorter, and (in
line  with  Roberts,  2006’s  hyperaccountability  argument),  the  incumbents  lose  on
average 5.5% of their support between elections.
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There is a relatively even ideological distribution among the government parties – 81
separate governments (in many cases by the same parties) lean on the right/conservative
part of the spectrum, while 60 are on the left.
The indicator measuring the complexity of the party systems and available electoral
alternative – effective number of parties (ENP) – is also relatively stable for most of the
EU countries throughout the period. The highest drop in ENP was observed after the
2003 Belgian election,  when the parliament  “lost”  two effective parties,  the highest
increase – after the 2016 election in Slovakia,  when the number of effective parties
increased by 2.8. The overall mean change however is merely 0.08, and the change was
lower than 1 for 127 elections, which means it is safe to assume that the party systems
of most member states are quite stable and do not change rapidly.
Figure 5: Boxplot of the effective number of parties by country, 1990-2016. Source:
Gallagher & Mitchell (2005), supporting information; visualization is mine.
This said, the ENP values show that the party systems of the member states themselves
are very different – there are countries like Hungary, Malta, Portugal and the United
Kingdom, for which ENP is barely higher than 2 for a number of elections, while on the
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other end of the spectrum sit countries like Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, which
have between 6 and 8 effective parliamentary parties after most elections. The total EU
mean ENP for the period is 4.061, showing that for most countries there is a healthy
possibility of switching parties as a result of punishing incumbents.
6.1.2 Macroeconomic development
Due to the specifics of the construction of the dataset, the macroeconomic data included
in it does not completely correspond with the macroeconomic development of the EU
during the entire studied period. The reason for this is an assumption of rather extreme
voter myopia (see Wlezien,  2015),  under which the economic conditions deemed to
have an impact and taken into account are formed through a snapshot of the economic
conditions no prior than six months before to the election. For this propose the observed
elections have been split in two groups – elections which took place in the first part of
the year, where the macroeconomic data used is from the previous year, and ones which
took place in the second part of the year, where the macro data is from the current year.
Figure 6: Distribution of the macroeconomic variables used (1990 – 2016). Source:
World Bank, Eurostat
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The first indicator of importance is the growth of GDP. Overall,  in terms of growth
pertaining to the dataset (and therefore different from the overall growth for the period)
the member-states demonstrate a positive trend – the mean growth for the entire subset
is 2.3%. The most noticeable and dramatic decreases are after the 2008 economic crisis,
when some countries lost significant parts of their gross domestic product, while in the
same time exhibiting soaring unemployment and high inflation.
Unsurprisingly,  the  former  Easter  Bloc  countries  experience  much  faster  economic
development  compared to  their  Western  counterparts(aside  from Ireland,  who has  a
quite distinct development model), which is expected due to their significantly lower
starting point of development. They are also more brittle, however, as is evident by the
sharp drops of GDP, as low as 10 percent in a single year, during the economic crisis.
This said, most of them were also quicker to recover from the economic shock and
return to growth.
Otherwise,  the period under review is  one of relative economic stability  and steady
growth for the majority of the EU economies. In terms of unemployment, the average
value for the entire period is just 9.1%. Again there is a significant East-West difference,
with  Eastern  member-states  having  a  mean  unemployment  of  10.8%  for  the  same
period. When it comes to inflation, however, the differences are negligible – while the
overall mean is 2.33%, for the Eastern members it is slightly higher, at 2.39%.
As  far  as  the  trends  in  the  macroeconomic  developments  of  the  member  states,
measured as the change of the three macro variables included in the model over the two
years prior to any particular election,  are concerned before 59 elections there was a
negative economic trend, while 82 were preceded  by positive economic development.
The data on inequality shows a quite curious trend – while, due to the nature of the
previous communist regimes, the former Eastern Bloc countries started with very low
levels of income inequality as expressed by the Gini coefficient (Alexeev and Gadi,
1993), inequality developed rather rapidly and even managed to surpass that of the West
and reach a mean of 30.9 compared to 29.8 for the complete European Union. On the
low end of the inequality spectrum sits Denmark in the beginning of the 90’s with a Gini
coefficient of between 20-25, on the high end  - Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal with
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values of 35-38 after the economic crisis. The overall trend for most European countries
during the 1990-2016 period is for a slow increase of income inequality.
6.2. Analytical statistics
This section presents the empirical results of the statistical analysis of the economic
voting in the EU. The method used for the analysis is ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, as implemented in the stats package, part of the standard R distribution. The
two subsections correspond to the two possible definitions of the dependent variable –
vote gained by the independent party in a particular election and vote change between
the previous and current election.
6.2.1 Incumbent vote as the DV
Below are presented the results of series of models, ordered by complexity. The first
tests the basic premise of economic voting, and the rest gradually introduce the rest of
the predictors described in the research design chapter. The second adds the incumbent’s
vote  in  the  previous  election.  The  third  introduces  the  variables  which  may  have
important impact on economic voting, and the fourth one adds coefficients for the direct
interactions between the European integration index and the macroeconomic variables. 
Table 4. Linear model results with incumbent vote as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept   28.52 (2.25) ***   5.38 (2.52) **   43.78 (7.34) *** 32.66 (10.86)
***
GDP growth   0.45 (0.19) **    0.32 (0.13) **   0.37 (0.12) *** 2.20 (0.88) **  
Unemployment - 0.13 (0.18)       - 0.22 (0.13) *      -0.26 (0.13) **  0.65 (0.66)       
Inflation   0.41 (0.36)        0.17 (0.26)        0.22 (0.24)       -0.13 (1.29)      
Incumbent vote 
in the previous election
-   0.74 (0.06) ***  0.45 (0.07) *** 0.47 (0.07) ***
Negative economic trend - - -0.55 (1.11)      -0.98 (1.14)      
European integration index - - - 0.01 (0.06)       0.15 (0.15)     
Years in office - - - 0.90 (0.55) *    -0.91 (0.55) *    
Income inequality - - - 0.42 (0.13) *** -0.40 (0.13) **  
Effective number of parties - -  - 3.05 (0.49) *** -3.04 (0.50) ***
Right wing incumbent - - 0.42 (1.13)      0.43 (1.13)      
Integration index
 X GDP Growth
- - - - 0.02 (0.01) ** 
Integration index 
X Unemployment
- - - - 0.01 (0.01)     
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Integration index X Inflation - - - - 0.007 (0.02)    
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.52 0.63 0.64
N = 136 N = 135 N = 130 N = 126
Source: Author’s calculations
All values are linear regression coefficients, standard error in parenthesis. Statistical
significance values denoted with asterisks, as follows: *** p < 0.01 , ** p < 0.05,  * p
< 0.1
Before analyzing the results  of the first set  of models, it  is worthwhile to run some
diagnostics in order to avoid some of the common pitfalls of regression analysis; these
were done with the  car (companion for applied regression) and  stats packages for R.
Since  many  the  independent  variables  are  macroeconomic  indicators,  which  have
previously  shown  to  be  quite  correlated  between  each  other,  the  first  test  is  for
multicollinearity, done on the third model, as it contains all the variables used but not
the interactions, which introduce significant collinearity due to being the product of two
of the other variables. The variance inflation factor test (see, for instance, Robinson and
Schumacker, 2009) shows that while all the variables in the model have a  root VIF
above 1, showing some evidence of collinearity, the previous incumbent vote has the
highest among them, with root VIF = 1.46; therefore there is no reasonable reason to
doubt the model fit and significance on the basis of multicollinearity. The residual plot
shows no signs of nonlinear relationships left out of the model, the q-q plot points to
relatively  normal  distribution  of  residuals,  and  the  scale-variance  plot  shows  little
evidence of heteroscedasticity. Finally, the leverage plot shows several outliers, which
may influence significantly the results of the regression model – the largest on being the
Greek 2012 election, where the socialist party lost 30.7% of its support over a single
electoral  cycle.  This  said,  the outlier  test  found no outliers  with a  p  < 0.05,  giving
reasonable reason to assume that the few outlier cases do not have significant effects on
the overall results.
The first thing to notice about the models is the relatively large fraction of the variance
in the vote  they explain – all but the first one have an R2 of above 0.50, pointing out
that the key explanatory factor which accounts for about half of the variance in the vote
is  the  previous  vote  for  the  incumbent  party. This  is  especially  true  for  the  second
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model, which introduces it as a variable, where every percent of the vote won on the
previous elections translates as 0.74 in the new vote.  With the introduction of more
variables the effect diminishes a bit, but it remains consistent in terms of direction and
very high statistical significance. 
It is also quite interesting that one of the “classic” two economic voting indicators –
inflation (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Kramer 1971) is completely unrelated with the
voting results,  regardless of the composition of the other variables.  It  has the worst
statistical  significance scores compared to  the rest  of the predictors  (at  some of the
models as bad as p = 0.66), and its effect, while consistent throughout all the models, is
in the opposite direction – had it  been significant it  would have been interpreted as
increases in the price of universally purchased goods resulting in increases in the vote
for the incumbent  government  party responsible  for  this  development,  which makes
little conceptual sense in economic terms.
A possible explanation for the lack of significant impact of inflation could be that it
interacts with the vote result in a non-linear way, which will not be registered correctly
by the linear regression models above. In order to test for this, several transformations
of  inflation  were  tried  as  an  independent  variable;  neither  the  squared,  nor  logged
inflation led to any significant or meaningful results.
This  said,  otherwise  the  base  economic  voting  model  meets  the  expectations  –  the
growth of gross domestic product has a highly significant effect in all the models, and in
the expected direction:  a growing economy in the year  prior  to  the election (or  the
current year for the elections which took place in the second part of the year) translates
into  an  increase  of  the  vote  for  the  incumbent  responsible  for  the  good  economic
development. The same is true for unemployment, although the results are somewhat
less consistent – it borders significance in the first model (with a p = 0.11),  but loses it
completely  in  the  last  one,  with  the  introduction  of  the  interactions  with  European
integration.  In  the  three  models  where  it  is  (almost)  significant  it  has  the  expected
negative impact on the incumbent vote, which is only amplified with the addition of
more  variables.  The  negative  economic  trend,  while  having  the  expected  negative
impact, is also not statistically significant. It may well be that it would be significant as
a interaction factor for the other macroeconomic variables, however.
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It is also interesting to note the high significance and impact of income inequality –
while the previous studies (Gelman et al., 2010; Linn and Nagler, 2014; Castillo, 2010)
had mixed results, there is little doubt about its importance in the current study. Since
here the Gini coefficient of inequality is taken as a nominal value rather than as change
compared  to  a  previous  period,  and  given  that  the  inequality  levels  see  quite  little
change over the years, a more appropriate interpretation of the negative effect is that
countries with lower levels of income inequality tend to punish the incumbent parties
less compared to those with high levels of inequality.
As expected, the alternative measure of clarity of responsibility – the effective number
of parties in the parliament resulting from the elections – also has a highly significant
significant and strong effect, as each “effective party” lowers the vote of the incumbent
by  about  3%.  Therefore,  the  diversification  and  ability  of  the  opposition  to  attract
enough  votes  as  to  enter  parliament  should  also  be  considered  when  constructing
economic voting models  pertaining to  the EU, as  the presence  of  viable  alternative
drives down the support for the incumbents. Note that while these findings contradict
those of Roberts (2006), but this could be explained with his choice to focus on the
change in the number of effective parties rather than their nominal value.
Despite the findings of several studies (Lewis-Beck and Costa-Lobo 2011, Çarkoğlu
1995),  there  is  no  evidence  on  a  definitive  direct  impact  of  the  incumbent  party’s
ideological stance on its electoral results. It is possible, however, that the interaction
between ideology and economic voting in the EU is more complex than the one which
could  be  included  in  the  models  presented  above;  some  studies  suggest  that  party
(and/or voter) ideology has an impact on the importance placed on different aspects of
the economy – eg. right/conservative parties are held responsible by their voters for
economic growth more than for unemployment, and vice versa for left/socialist parties.
While testing this further is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to achieve this
through incorporating the ideological differences in a weighing scheme applied to the
macroeconomic indicators, or by using interaction terms, in a way similar to the one
used here to study the impact of European integration.
Also  consistent  with  previous  research  is  the  effect  of  the  time  spent  in  office  on
incumbent support
46
(Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) – the results here point to
a loss of slightly less than 1% of the vote of the incumbent party for every year spent in
office, compared to the previous election. It has to be noted, however, that the time
spent in office has the highest standard error of all the variables (in model #3), so it
could be expected that there will be major differences between the individual member
states in the way it impacts the final electoral results. 
Having established a pretty robust economic voting model, the final step is to test the
impact of the EU integration. The nominal value of the integration, taken together with
the other predictors is, unsurprisingly, not significant – there is little reason to consider
that the degree of integration itself as a determinant for the increase of decrease of the
vote for the incumbent government. Despite that, isolating it from the other independent
variables and construing a separate linear model does produce significant results, with a
coefficient of - 0.20 (0.08) and p = 0.02, which points to a possibility that it could also
interact successfully with other factors, not included in the current study.
What is of greater importance here are the ways that EU economic integration index
interacts  with  the  macroeconomic  variables.  The  most  obvious  interaction  is  the
“flattening”  of  the  effects,  which  is  expected  given  that  the  interaction  is  achieved
through  multiplication  (see  Jaccard  and  Turrisi,  2003).  If  the  hypothesis  that  the
integration in the EU blurs the lines of economic responsibility was completely true, one
would expect that the interaction terms would no longer have a statistically significant
impact on the vote results. This is partially true, as inflation had no significant effect
even in the simpler models, and the significance of the effect of unemployment has
dropped  below  the  threshold.  The  effect  of  the  growth  of  GDP, however,  remains
significant at the 95% confidence level even after the inclusion of the interaction factor,
and has  the  opposite  direction  to  the  one  expected  –  the  combination  of  economic
growth and European integration has a negative impact on the vote results, while growth
taken by itself has a positive one (while the effect size may seem small, one needs to
keep in mind that the interaction term varies between -995 and 1768, which means that
even a very small coefficient can produce large impact on the resulting vote for the
incumbent).  Given  then  interpretation  of  interaction  term  effects  and  its  specific
conditional nature, however, it is sufficient to point out only the persisting statistical
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significance of GDP - even though the relationship is relatively weak, it still contradicts
my hypothesis and demonstrates that factoring in EU integration does not completely
discard  the  economic  voting  effects.  The  3-dimensional  plot  below summarizes  the
separated effect of the GDP growth and its interaction between the EU index on the vote
for the incumbent party (the only statistically significant effect, according to the models
above).
Figure 7: Incumbent party vote, GDP growth (limited between -10 and +10%) and EU
integration  (interaction  limited  between  -600  and  +600),  with  regression  plane.
Source: Author’s calculations
The plot above shows little to no relationship between the three variables; the regression
plane is  almost  parallel  to  the horizontal  dimension of the graph,  and the distances
between the individual data points and the bottom are very similar, but for a few of the
points  (indicating  little  variance  in  incumbent  party  vote  due  to  difference  in  the
interaction of GDP and the European integration index).  In the same time,  here the
effect  of  the  GDP growth itself  seems quite  random – at  least  visually  it  is  rather
difficult to discern a particular pattern or regularity in the relationship between the two.
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It could be claimed with a rather high degree of certainty that there is a systematic
relationship between the three variables, but it is quite weak. 
In  order  to  test  this  relationships  further,  a  separate  linear  model  was  constructed,
containing only the interactions  between the three macroeconomic variables and the EU
integration index. In this case, there were no statistically significant effects (the most
significant again was that of economic growth, but at a p = 0.27). While in frequentists
statistics there is no direct way to test and establish definitively the lack of relationship
between the IV’s and the DV, I  find the diminishing statistical  significance and the
instability of the effects to be decent evidence of the blurring economic responsibility.
6.2.2 Difference in the vote between the previous and current election as the DV
The second set  of models follows the same structure of the first  ones,  but uses the
change in the vote between the two elections as the dependent variable. The first model
is the “bare” economic voting, the second one introduces the secondary set of variables,
and the third one – the interactions with the EU integration index. As the results are
quite similar to the first model, I will discuss in detail only the differences between
them. 
Table 5. Linear model results with incumbent vote change as the dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept - 2.70 (1.68)   18.73 (7.66) **   8.16 (11.95)
GDP growth   0.28 (0.14) **   0.32 (0.14) *   2.23 (1.03) *
Unemployment   - 0.23 (0.27) * - 0.23 (0.15)   0.93 (0.77)
Inflation - 0.02 (0.27)   0.19 (0.28) - 1.52 (1.48)
Negative economic trend - - 0.41 (1.33) - 1.07 (1.33)
European integration index - - 0.03 (0.07)    0.13 (0.17)
Years in office - - 1.35 (0.64) *  - 1.07 (0.64) *
Income inequality - - 0.41 (0.15) **  - 0.42 (0.15) **
Effective number of parties - - 0.80 (0.44) *  - 0.81 (0.43) *
Right wing incumbent - 1.69 (1.31) 1.52 (1.30)
Integration index : GDP 
Growth
- -  -0.03 (0.01) *
Integration index : 
Unemployment
- - - 0.01 (0.01) 
Integration index : Inflation - -  0.03 (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.08 0.11
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N = 136 N = 130 N = 127
Source: Author’s calculations
All values are linear regression coefficients, standard error in parenthesis. Statistical
significance values denoted with asterisks, as follows: *** p < 0.01 , ** p < 0.05,  * p
< 0.1
Similarly to the first set of models, the tests for basic regression assumptions show no
sings of violation. Tested on the full model without interactions, all the root VIF values
are above one, but the highest is at root VIF = 1.07, pointing to almost complete absence
of multicollinearity. While the leverage plot shows several outliers, none of them has a
significant impact on the model. There is also little evidence of heteroscedasticity or
non-normality of the distribution.
Broadly, the second set of models confirms the findings of the first. In terms of the basic
premise of economic voting, inflation has no significant effect, while economic growth
has a consistently  significant effect in the expected direction, and unemployment is
significant in some models, but not in others. Income inequality remains an important
factor, and so do the years  spent  in  office,  while  the  EU integration  index and the
economic trend are still not significant.
The interactions of the three macroeconomic variables with the EU integration index
also remain the same – there is a statistically significant effect of the interaction with
GDP growth,  and again  in  a  negative  direction;  the  interaction  with  unemployment
borders statistical significance, while the one with inflation does not.
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7. Conclusions
The – albeit modest for the primary goal – results of this study have proven to be quite
definitive for the presence and circumstances of economic voting in the parliamentary
elections of the member-states of the European union. Several statistical tests, ranging
in complexity of composition have established that there are several persistent factors
with significant effect for the electoral performance of incumbent parties – out of the
three  “classic”  economic  voting  predictors,  GDP  growth  (across  the  board)  and
unemployment  (in  more  than  half  of  the  specific  combinations  of  predictors)  have
proven to have impact, while inflation was of lesser to nonexistent importance. Several
other factors, which have shown patchy performance in the past – the effective number
of  parties,  signifying  viable  political  alternatives,  the  length  of  the  term  of  the
incumbent party and the inequality of income in the studied countries, have also proven
to be reliable predictors of the electoral results of incumbent parties. The effect of all
indicators  follow  their  hypothesized  role  –  e.g.  higher  effective  number  of  parties
diminishes the results of incumbent, while a growing economy boosts it.
More  crucially,  the  study  established  that  it  is  possible  to  evaluate  the  patterns  of
economic voting in a pan-EU contexts, regardless of the vastly different institutional
and political settings of the different member states; a choice that at first appears to be at
best  methodologically  dubious.  Moreover,  the  study has  provided  its  results  on  the
macro level of analysis, which, while quite popular in the foundational works in the
field of economic voting, has lately lost popularity in favor of individual level analysis.
As a step towards establishing the impact of European multilevel governance on the
economic voting phenomenon, this study also extended (with some simplification), both
in  geographical  and  temporal  terms,  an  existing  index  of  European  economic
integration, the findings of which may be equally useful to other studies dealing with
European integration.
Finally, as to the chief goal of the study – estimating the impact of the EU and the
blurring  of  the  lines  of  economic  responsibility  in  the  unique  system of  European
multilevel  governance – the results  are  a little  less encouraging.  The hypothesis  set
before  the  actual  tests  was  that  macroeconomic  factors  will  cease  to  be  significant
predictors of incumbent results, and while their statistical significance has diminished
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quite a lot, economic growth in particular does not fully lose its significant effect. A
possible interpretation could be that there is some blurring of the lines of responsibility
between  the  national  and supranational  levels  in  the  EU,  but  it  is  not  sufficient  to
completely remove national-level economic voting; this could also be an artifact of the
chosen objective measures of economic voting, as there is a possibility that they do not
reflect appropriately the subjective vote choice. 
It is clear that the blurring of the lines of responsibility requires more study, through
different  approaches  and  tools.  The  first  possibility  that  I  propose  is  to  choose
alternative statistical  techniques – while the frequentist  approach applied here is  not
capable of providing evidence in support of a null hypothesis, but merely reject it (and
the  underlying  goal  is  establishing  the  lack  of  economic  voting  under  specific
conditions), Bayesian techniques can substantiate a null hypothesis and offer odds of it
being true.
While the current study limited itself only to the past 26 years of European integration,
it could be well worth it to go backwards in time, and study a longer portion of the
history of the EU, thus creating a more dynamic picture of the process of blurring of
responsibility. The primary issue with this approach is the general lack of data – most of
the components of the integration index, for instance, could be traced back only to the
middle  of  the  90’s,  and  even  then  some  imputation  was  necessary.
Finally, it  will  also  be  worthwhile  to  completely  switch  the  level  of  analysis  –  an
individual-level  study, covering  a  wide number  of  European countries  and elections
could either substantiate further or disapprove the findings of this study, while in the
same time dealing with the limitations and pitfalls of the macro approach applied here. 
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